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I.

INTRODUCTION

In December of 2001, Enron Corporation, one of the nation’s largest energy and
gas providers, filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code; one of
the largest corporate bankruptcy filings at that time1. A myriad of scholarship, books,
and articles have been written on Enron’s meteoric rise and fall. The failure in oversight
that permeated Enron’s corporate gatekeepers such as Enron’s Board of Directors and
upper management, its public accountants Arthur Andersen, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and other professionals who were tasked to navigate the Enron empire, was
disturbing and disconcerting on a number of levels; not the least of which being the blow
to investor confidence; the foundation on which the capital markets are built.
On the heels of Enron’s debacle came the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 20022; the far
reaching legislative reform which in theory was designed to “shore-up” the accounting
and corporate governance shortfalls that the legislature and the investing public believed
was what allowed Enron to do what it did unabated. Supplementing the reforms set forth
in the Sarbanes Oxley Act are a number of accounting rules, guidelines, and
interpretations, which in theory are designed to curtail the type of accounting fraud Enron
perpetrated through its use (or more accurately abuse) of what are referred to as Special
Purpose Entities (“SPEs”, or Special Purpose Entities). Although much has been written
chronicling and analyzing the various aspects of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, little has been
written analyzing the accounting guidance related to special purpose entities.
Since the Enron debacle, a dark cloud has been cast over the Special Purpose
Entity by the investment and financial community. The line distinguishing the difference
between Special Purpose Entity use and Special Purpose Entity abuse has been blurred to
the point where the use of such entity and its abuse are considered one in the same; i.e.
that special purpose entities by their very nature are these ominous, nefarious, inherently
evil entities whose only purpose is to defraud, obfuscate and manipulate financial
statements. The purpose of this piece, among other things, is to challenge this
assumption and conclusion.
THESIS
The focus for this paper is to take a look at both the new accounting rules in the
“post-Enron” era that have been enacted, in significant part, due to what happened with
Enron and its SPE use, as well as the accounting rules in effect during both the “pre” and
“post-Enron” eras related to SPEs. This article examines the accounting reforms and
legislative approaches currently being taken regarding accounting for and disclosures of
SPEs. This piece questions whether or not those approaches are in fact the correct ones.
The argument being that the accounting practices Enron exercised with its financial
reporting was not due to deficiencies in the rules that were in effect at the time, but were
1

Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Enron Corp. Files
Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, § A at 1.
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Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. 7201.
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due to persons within the Enron organization that were determined to circumnavigate
those rules regardless of their sufficiency.
The article will examine closely the method and manner by which Enron
perpetrated such fraud, with the goal of demonstrating that it wasn’t a lack of accounting
rules or deficient interpretive accounting guidance that resulted in Enron’s improprieties
related to SPEs, but instead was dishonest and fraudulent behavior by Enron management
that was the real problem. The next part of the piece will cite and critique both current
rules and some proposed accounting reforms being considered, analyzing their current
and potential effectiveness, with the goal of highlighting reasons why the proposed
reforms may not meet their desired or stated objectives. Finally, the piece will explore
and suggest some alternative approaches once the issue has been reframed. In the
alternative, this piece, in essence, suggests that enforcement efforts should be focused on
the SPE abusers instead of the SPEs themselves.
The overall goal of this piece is to question whether we should be taking a
different approach to financial fraud in the area of Special Purpose Entities than the path
currently being taken; the end result being that we will ultimately be making it more
difficult and more costly for the myriad of legitimate Special Purpose Entity use that may
or may not be able to continue in light of the accounting and disclosure requirements
currently in place and that have been enacted to a large degree in response to what
occurred with Enron.
II.
A.

WHAT IS A SPECIAL PURPOSE ENITY?

SPEs Historically

To understand why or more importantly how Enron perpetrated the financial
accounting fraud that it did, we must first understand from a general standpoint what an
SPE is, and more importantly, how it works. “Until recently, many people in the
accounting profession, including accounting educators, never heard of SPEs. Some who
heard of these esoteric financing vehicles knew little about how they operated or the
accounting standards that guided the accounting and financial reporting by companies
who sponsor SPEs. Reports in the popular press that preceded Enron’s Chapter 11 filing
in December 2001 introduced many accountants for the first time to the topic of SPEs
and sent many CPAs scrambling to understand the generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) related to these entities. Even though SPE financing vehicles have
been around for about two decades, they failed to capture the attention of many
participants in the mainstream of accounting discourse. A search for references to SPEs
in financial accounting textbooks yields virtually no results, and a search of the academic
and professional accounting literature provides, at best, a limited explanation of this
accounting area.3

3

Bob Jensen, Bob Jensen’s Overview of Special Purpose Entities,
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/speOverview.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
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B.

What are SPEs? – A Look at the Various Forms

Though SPEs are considered to be complex and complicated entities, the general
premise of a special purpose entity is simple. An SPE is an entity formed for a discreet
and isolated purpose; to adhere to a specific business or economic objective; a simple
premise or starting off point from which the concept builds.
The idea behind the Special Purpose Entity is to narrow the scope of risk to the
assets and liabilities placed in the special purpose entity, such that potential investors or
equity holder’s fortunes or misfortunes will be based entirely and exclusively on what
occurs with respect to the assets and liabilities placed within the SPE. Note, this is the
general idea but there are a number of variations on this single theme.
Generally, SPEs fall into three categories, the joint venture, the synthetic lease,
and the asset securitization or “off-balance sheet financing”. Granted, their can be a
number of variations on these three major themes, but the vast majority of SPE
transactions fall in one of the three. Each type will be discussed in turn.
(i)

The Joint Venture:

The Joint venture. Perhaps the most basic and straight-forward SPE type. In a
joint venture, two or more parties come together and engage in a “venture” that is
separate and apart from the respective entities4. The conduit through which such ventures
can occur is the SPE. This conduit can take any number of forms, a partnership, a
corporation, a trust, an LLC, etc. Understand, it’s the entity’s purpose, not its legal form
from which the SPE moniker is derived. A typical joint venture may be the construction
of a gas pipeline for example to conduct off-shore oil drilling.5 In this instance, the entire
scope of the venture will be transferred to a separate and discreet business entity apart
from the respective companies. The SPE will own both the assets and liabilities
associated with the project.
As was mentioned earlier, the SPE is designed to conduct just that one prespecified and isolated activity. Accordingly, potential investors in the venture are
attracted to the venture because the cash flows and risks of the venture are clearly
specified by design and are isolated from any risks associated with the respective
corporations as a whole.6 By contrast, where one makes an investment in a fully
integrated corporation, the corporate management can engage in a variety of endeavors
and activities that were not specified by prior agreement with the investor7, thereby
4

See Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/Joint_venture (giving an overview of a joint venture) (last
visited Feb. 21, 2006).
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Bala G. Dharan, Financial Engineering with Special Purpose Entities, in Enron Meltdown: Facts,
Analysis and Recommendations 103, 104 (Julia Brazelton, ed.).
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making the investor vulnerable to the corporation’s fortunes as a whole; market downturns, unprofitable divisions, ineffective management, poor expansion choices, etc.
Accordingly, when it comes time to invest in a project with well-defined risk and
return parameters, many investors prefer the isolated and uniquely identifiable nature of
an SPE to a more diffusely defined corporate form8. For this reason, SPEs have been
used for some time as a preferred form of financing for large international projects and
other projects with well-defined cash flows and risk characteristics9. To insure that the
SPE operates in the manner the venturing parties contemplated, the chartering documents
(such as the articles of incorporation, the partnership agreement, or the operating
agreement as applicable), will narrow the SPEs scope to only those permitted activities.
Key things to observe with the SPE used in the joint venture context. The first is
that with the joint venture, the business purpose and rationale for entering into such
ventures are clear. The design and structure of such ventures and what they are trying to
do and accomplish, for the most part make sense as well. Provided proper formation
occurs and proper protocols are followed, the use of the SPE in the joint venture context
is a legitimate and non-controversial use of the Special Purpose Entity.
(ii)

Synthetic Leases:

(a)

The Typical Synthetic Lease Structure

The second category where we see SPEs used as an integral part of a transaction
is what is referred to as the synthetic lease. A typical synthetic lease example; ABC
Company wants the use of a building for its corporate offices for the next 20 years. The
land and building would cost $100 million to buy. Alternatively, ABC forms a separate
legal entity, an SPE to purchase the building. The SPE in turn borrows the necessary
funds to acquire the building. The financial institution may loan the SPE up to 90% of
the fair market value of the real estate. The loan is secured by the building. The
remaining 10% of the cost is put up by an outside equity investor. The outside investor
owns 100% of the shareholder equity in the SPE which results in all of the outside equity
being owned by someone other than the sponsoring corporation.
Corporate Motivation behind the Synthetic Lease
The synthetic lease (also known as an "off-balance-sheet lease," or "off-balancesheet loan," or a "master lease") is a financing structure used by many public companies
to finance up to 100% of the cost of acquisition of certain real and personal property at a
favorable cost. It is a structure with a split personality — it is accounted for as an
operating lease, but treated for economic and tax purposes as a financing transaction, and

8

Bala G. Dharan, Financial Engineering with Special Purpose Entities, in Enron Meltdown: Facts,
Analysis and Recommendations 103, 104 (Julia Brazelton, ed.).
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it gets the most favorable treatment in each case. As a result, it can satisfy a number of
apparently inconsistent needs.10
The tension in the synthetic leasing area is this. Real property and the debt and
expense associated with it are usually undesirable additions to the financial statements of
a company. Under GAAP, the "end-user" in a synthetic lease transaction, that is, the
entity that leases the property and becomes the tenant does not carry the asset or the debt
on its financial statements, hence the term “off-balance sheet.” Because neither the asset
nor the debt associated with it is carried on the balance sheet, the balance sheet is freed of
a non-producing real estate asset and the burden of the attendant debt. The debt-to-equity
ratio and other financial ratios derived from the balance sheet are improved as a result.
The effect may be to enhance the company’s borrowing capacity and its stock price. Few
accounting and securities disclosures are required. Because the property does not appear
on the end-user’s income statement, for GAAP accounting purposes, neither interest
deductions nor book depreciation are deducted from revenues. Rental payments are
deducted, but the amount of those payments is lower than the sum of the items that are
not included. The effect on the income statement is to increase reported earnings. This
improves return on equity, return on assets and debt coverage ratios, and may also
increase share price, especially if the company is in an industry such as high technology,
where the corporation’s share price is sensitive to a price-earnings multiplier.11
On the other hand, for tax cash-flow, economic and operational purposes, the enduser treats the transaction as if it has borrowed the funds necessary to purchase and
develop the property, and as if it owns the property. It depreciates the property and takes
the interest deduction for federal income tax purposes, instead of recording the payments
as rental expense. The effect is to increase deductions, concomitantly to drive down
taxable income and tax liability, and therefore to increase cash flow. In addition, the enduser gets full control of development, construction, management and disposition of the
property and the real economic benefit of any appreciation of the property, advantages
not usually available to a tenant.12
As a third benefit, the lease structure has many of the advantages of a so-called
"structured financing," that is, a financing structure in which the real estate asset is
10

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 (last visited Feb. 21, 2006)
(originally published in the California Real Property Journal, official publication of the Real Property
Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).
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Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 (last visited Feb. 21, 2006)
(originally published in the California Real Property Journal, official publication of the Real Property
Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).
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separated from the bankruptcy risks of the owner or the former owner of the asset. This
feature makes the transaction more attractive to the capital markets and drives down the
total cost of the financing, which makes the synthetic lease one of the cheapest sources of
real estate financing. The rate may be two to three hundred basis points (that is, two to
three percentage points) lower than if the transaction were priced as a conventional loan
at prime rates. Up to one hundred percent of the cost of the project (including acquisition,
development and construction costs, soft costs and the cost of personal property
acquisition) is financed, and often the lease payments are equal to interest-only payments
on the amount financed. This all means increased income (which may increase stock
price) and better cash flow for the end-user.13
Because of the complexity and the structuring and transaction costs, synthetic
lease transactions are generally large. It is difficult to justify a synthetic lease structure
for an acquisition of less than $10 million, although as real estate professionals are
becoming more familiar with synthetic leases, and more facile in structuring and
documenting them, the transaction costs are declining.14 The synthetic lease structure is
not limited to the acquisition or construction of only one facility. A transaction can be
structured for a number of different properties under the same financing facility, thereby
driving down costs on a per-property basis and making feasible the leasing of less
expensive single properties. And in at least one transaction, a synthetic lease was used to
provide nearly one-third of the financing for a $1.8 billion acquisition of one company by
another.15

(b)

Accounting Treatment for Synthetic Leases

(1)

Operating vs. Capital Lease

The accounting for leases in general under GAAP is based on the view that a
lease transaction that transfers substantially all of the benefits and risks of ownership
should be accounted for as the acquisition of the asset and the incurrence of an obligation
by the tenant. Such a lease is characterized by the tenant as a "capital lease." This

13

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 (last visited Feb. 21, 2006)
(originally published in the California Real Property Journal, official publication of the Real Property
Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).
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(originally published in the California Real Property Journal, official publication of the Real Property
Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).

15

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
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(originally published in the California Real Property Journal, official publication of the Real Property
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treatment requires that the asset and the obligation associated with it be carried on the
company’s balance sheet.16
In other cases the tenant should account for the lease as an "operating lease," or a
true rental arrangement.17
FASB No. 13 provides that if a particular lease meets any ONE of the following
classification criteria, it must be accounted for as a capital lease:
(1) The lease transfers ownership of the property to the tenant by the end of the lease
term.
(2) The lease contains an option to purchase the leased property at a bargain price.
The synthetic lease is structured to fail this and the previous criterion by
providing a fixed, market-rate purchase price at the end of the lease term.
(3) The lease term is equal to or greater than 75 percent of the estimated economic
life of the leased property. The synthetic lease is structured to fail this test by
limiting the term of the lease, such that the lease term does not exceed 75 percent
of the leased property’s economic life.
(4) The present value of rental and other minimum lease payments equals or exceeds
90% of the fair market value of the leased property. This test is failed by
structuring the transaction so that the present value of the rental and other
minimum lease payments, including the terminal residual payment due upon
lease termination, is less than 90% of the fair market value of the real estate.18
If none of the four criteria are met, the tenant treats the lease as an operating lease.
The effect of characterizing the lease as an operating lease for accounting purposes is that
the debt does not appear on the corporation’s balance sheet (although the lease obligation
does appear as a footnote in the financial statements). All lease payments appear on the
income statement as currently deductible operating expenses.19 Thus, if structured
16

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 (Section V discussing
accounting treatment) (last visited Feb. 21, 2006) (originally published in the California Real Property
Journal, official publication of the Real Property Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).
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Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 (citing FASB no. 13,
summary) (last visited Feb. 21, 2006) (originally published in the California Real Property Journal,
official publication of the Real Property Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).
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Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 (citing FASB no. 13,
summary) (last visited Feb. 21, 2006) (originally published in the California Real Property Journal,
official publication of the Real Property Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).
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Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 at note 19 (Section V of the
article – commenting on the accounting treatment for capital leases – “If the lease cannot pass these
testes for operating leases in FASB No. 13, FASB No. 13 provides that the lease will be treated for
accounting purposes as a capital lease. Accountants recognize capital lease interests as an asset on a
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correctly, the synthetic lease improves the end-user’s return on equity,20 return on
assets,21 and debt coverage ratios.22

(2)

Consolidated Income Statement and Balance Sheet Issues

There are two other concerns that must be addressed from an accounting point of
view for a synthetic lease. Under certain facts, the end-user and the lessor must
consolidate (or combine) their income statements and their balance sheets for GAAP
reporting purposes. This would eliminate the off-balance sheet advantage of the
transaction to the tenant. The question here is whether the SPE lacks economic substance,
and is therefore not a separate entity from the end-user for accounting purposes.23
The EITF (Emerging Issues Task Force)24 has issued guidelines that apply to
leasing transactions in which an SPE is the lessor. Under the guidelines, a tenant should
consolidate its income statement and balance sheet with the SPE when EACH of the
following tests is met:
(1) Substantially all of the activities of the SPE involve assets that are leased to a
single tenant. This test is passed in virtually every synthetic lease transaction as
most synthetic lease transactions are structured in this manner.
(2) The expected residual risks and rewards of the leased assets and the obligations
imposed by the underlying debt of the SPE rest on the tenant. This test is also
always passed.

balance sheet, which must be off-set by a recognition of the payment obligation) (last visited Feb. 21,
2006) (originally published in the California Real Property Journal, official publication of the Real
Property Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).
20

The “Return on Equity” measures the ratio of net income in relation to owner’s equity…return on
equity measures how successfully management is in utilizing the owner’s capital. ACCOUNTING FOR
LAWYERS, 344 (David R. Herwitz & Matthew J. Barrett eds., Foundation Press 3d ed. 2001).

21

The “Return on Assets” ratio measures a business’s profitability relative to its total assets, usually
expressed in terms of average assets, however defined. Most simply, analysts define average assets as
the average of beginning and ending assets for the period. ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS, 344 (David R.
Herwitz & Matthew J. Barrett eds., Foundation Press 3d ed. 2001).

22

The “Debt Coverage” ratio determines how many times a business can cover both interest and the
current portion of long-term debt. ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS, 340 (David R. Herwitz & Matthew J.
Barrett eds., Foundation Press 3d ed. 2001).

23

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 (Section V, B) (last visited
Feb. 21, 2006) (originally published in the California Real Property Journal, official publication of the
Real Property Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).

24

The Emerging Issues Task force is an organization formed in 1984 by the Financial Accounting
Standards board to provide assistance with timely financial reporting. The EITF holds public meetings
in order to identify and resolve accounting issues occurring in the financial world.
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(3) The owner of record of the SPE has NOT made an "initial substantive residual
equity capital investment that remains at risk during the entire lease term."25
Since all of the tests must be met in order for the consolidation requirement to
apply, the transaction must be structured to fail the third test. The amount initially
invested and actually “at risk” of loss by the owners of the SPE must be “substantive.”
There is no safe harbor or bright line test to determine what an initial substantive residual
equity capital investment is. Most interpretations of the rule, and the application
discussed in the guidelines themselves, seem to indicate that a 3% minimum initial equity
investment will be enough to fail the test, and this is followed by most practitioners.26

(3)

Sale and Leaseback

The second risk from an accounting point of view is that the transaction may be
characterized as a sale and leaseback, again eliminating the accounting benefits of the
transaction. Statement 98 of FASB 22 provides that the seller in a transaction is
precluded from recognizing a sale if it retains an option to purchase or provides
guarantees or other provisions that constitute continuing involvement with the property.
Because provisions like those are central to the synthetic lease structure, the end-user
must avoid obtaining title to the leased property, including the land, prior to the
transaction. If the SPE purchases the property directly from a third party, the sale and
leaseback problem is avoided. It is also necessary that the end-user avoid guarantees or
commitments during the construction period that would make it, in substance, the owner
of the project during that period.27

(c)

Tax Treatment for Synthetic Leases

For federal income tax purposes, the objective is to structure the transaction so
that the end-user is characterized as the owner of the leased property, and the transaction
is treated as a financing/conditional sale. If the end-user is characterized as the owner of
the property, it will be able to deduct interest payments and depreciate the improvements

25

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 (Section V, B) (last visited
Feb. 21, 2006) (originally published in the California Real Property Journal, official publication of the
Real Property Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).
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See infra. Part III (in-depth discussion of issued involving the 3% minimum equity rule).
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Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, The Synthetic Lease: Off-Balance Sheet Financing of Real
Property, http://www.smrh.com/publications/pubview.cfm?pubID=116 (Section V, C) (last visited
Feb. 21, 2006) (originally published in the California Real Property Journal, official publication of the
Real Property Law Section, State Bar of California, spring 1998).
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to the property. The tax standards that must be satisfied are not as clear-cut as the
accounting standards.28
Although there are a number of factors considered by the courts and by the
Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS"), the most important factor is determining whether
the landlord or the tenant has the significant “benefits and burdens of ownership”. The
IRS and the courts look through the form of the transaction and focus on the transaction’s
economic substance. If, after examining who retains the benefits and burdens of
ownership, it appears that the transaction actually is an arrangement of financing, and that
the end-user has acquired the property through a conditional sale, it is likely that the
transaction will be taxed as a sale. In the court case dealing with this issue, the court
found for the taxpayer. The court emphasized the need to examine all the facts and
circumstances of the transaction to determine its real substance.29
Where…a genuine multi-party transaction with economic substance which is
compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities is imbued with taxindependent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax avoidance features that have
meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of the rights
and duties effectuated by the parties. Expressed another way, so long as the lessor retains
significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status, the form of the
transaction adopted by the parties govern[s] for tax purposes.30
Subsequent case law and IRS rulings have followed the Lyon case by considering
motive, intent, the relationship of the parties to one another, and the reasonable
expectation of the parties. IRS rulings, while not necessarily controlling, do give
guidance. In Revenue Ruling 55-540, the IRS discussed the characterization of equipment
transactions as purchases and sales, or as leases. The IRS said that the characterization
depends on the intent of the parties and that, in the absence of compelling persuasive
factors to the contrary, an intent to treat the transaction as a purchase and sale may exist
if, for example, some portion of the payments is recognizable as the equivalent of
interest, or if the total rental payments and any option price paid approximated the price
that would have been paid for a purchase at the time of entering into the agreement, plus
interest.31
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The economic reality of the synthetic lease transaction favors treatment of the
end-user as the owner. The only real risk to the lessor is that the property will lose
substantially all of its residual value. The consensus today is that the transaction will be
taxed as the financing of a purchase and development of the property, although this is not
a certain result by any means.32
If the right tax characterization is not reached, the transaction will be viewed as a
lease (with the SPE as the lessor and the end-user as the lessee), rather than a conditional
sale from the SPE to the end-user. If the end-user is treated as a lessee by the IRS, it can
deduct the lease payments for income tax purposes, but it will not be able to deduct
interest payments nor, more importantly, will it be able to depreciate the improvements to
the property. It will, in effect, have lost the income tax advantage of the dual character of
the synthetic lease structure.33

(d)

The Argument for Harmonizing the Dual Treatment for Tax and Accounting
Purposes

Regarding synthetic leases and the dual treatment for tax and accounting
purposes, there is sentiment in the field of academia that this “transactional sleight of
hand”34, should not be permitted. Admittedly, there is a discordant paradox when you
have a company that can take the very same transaction and categorize it one way for
financial accounting purposes, and another for tax purposes even though the economic
substance of the transaction is the same. Some have advocated that the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), the governing body that sets accounting
standards, eliminate the “bright line” tests used for financial reporting purposes and
follow the “benefits and burdens” test that the Internal Revenue Service follows; the
argument being that the “benefits and burdens” test is based on classifying the transaction
based on its economic substance versus an arbitrary classification that conforms to brightline tests of form.35
Likewise, the SEC has noted similar issues in its assessment of the bright-line
tests set-forth in determining capital vs. operating treatment for leases. The crux of the
32
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SEC’s argument being that transactions that are similar in terms of economic substance
can have very different accounting treatments based on slight variations in the
transaction’s actual form. For example, the SEC notes, the difference between a lease
that commits an issuer to payments equaling 89% of an asset’s fair value vs. 90% of an
asset’s fair value results in different accounting treatment, one qualifying as an operating
lease and the other relegated to the less favored status of being accounted for as a capital
lease.36
In spite of some in the field of academia, as well as the SEC’s recognition of the
current problems with the existing rules, the SEC nonetheless acknowledges that it would
be difficult to change those rules given that lease structuring based on the current
accounting guidance is so prevalent. Such efforts to change would likely be met with
strong resistance, both from preparers who have become accustomed to designing leases
that achieve various reporting goals and from other parties that assist those preparers.37
To quantify that number, as of December 31, 200338, it is estimated that 63% of
the total population of issuers reported having operating leases as a part of their
operations, and an estimated 22% reported having capital leases.39 In terms of the dollar
amounts, an estimated $1.2 trillion dollars are tied up in operating leases with another
estimated $45 billion tied up in capital leases.40 With the prospect of all or a significant
portion of these operating leases being re-classified resulting in debt recognition on an
issuer’s balance sheet, it is clear why there would be resistance to significant changes to
the current accounting rules. In spite of these interesting issues related to synthetic
leases, such is not this article’s focus. In explaining SPEs in general, however the piece
would not be complete without some discussion of synthetic lease transactions and the
current issues related to synthetic leases.
But this article focuses on SPE abuse; i.e. a look at an issuer’s failure to follow
existing accounting guidance, which does not appear to be prevalent in the synthetic lease
context. The issues with the synthetic lease transaction deal with whether the current
accounting regime related to synthetic lease transactions are appropriate even where the
36
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letter of the law is followed explicitly. In sum, the synthetic lease discussion is here to
illustrate yet another common transaction in which the SPE is used, and to point out the
fact that in spite of some issues that are in flux, SPE use in forming synthetic leases is
nonetheless another legitimate use of the SPE structure.
(iii)

Asset Securitizations – [Off Balance Sheet Financing] –

Finally, there is the Special Purpose Entity used in the context of Asset
Securitizations.
(a)

How Asset Securitizations Work

A company that wants to obtain financing through securitization begins by
identifying assets that can be used to raise funds.41 These assets typically represent rights
to payments at future dates and are usually in the form of "receivables."42 The company
that owns the receivables is usually called the "originator" or “sponsor”. The risk that
these payments may not be made on time is an important factor in valuing the
receivables. As long as the originator can reasonably predict the aggregate rate of default,
however, it can securitize even those receivables that present some risk of
uncollectability. Therefore, a statistically large pool of receivables due from many
obligors, for which payment is reasonably predictable, is preferable to a pool of a smaller
number of receivables due from a few obligors.43
After identifying the assets to be used in the securitization, the originator transfers
the receivables to the newly formed special purpose corporation, trust, or other legally
separate entity. As discussed earlier, the transfer is intended to separate the receivables
from risks associated with the originator.44 For this reason, the originator will often
structure the transfer so that it constitutes a "true sale,” a sale that is sufficient under
bankruptcy law to remove the receivables from the originator's bankruptcy estate.45 The
concept of asset transfers and proper accounting treatment for those transfers will be
discussed in later sections.
To raise funds to purchase these receivables, the SPE issues securities in the
capital markets. The SPE, however, must be structured as "bankruptcy remote" to gain
acceptance as an issuer of capital market securities. Bankruptcy remote in this context
means that the SPE is unlikely to be adversely affected if the originator files for
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bankruptcy.46 Insuring that the transaction is structured so that the assets placed in the
SPE are bankruptcy remote can be a key factor in inducing investors to buy the securities
the SPE issues.
To achieve bankruptcy remoteness, the SPE's organizational structure strictly
limits its permitted business activities. The goal is to prevent creditors (other than holders
of the SPE's securities) from having claims against the SPE47 that would enable them to
file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the SPE. Furthermore, an SPE that is
owned or controlled by the originator is usually required to have one or more independent
directors. The SPE must also attempt to observe all appropriate third party formalities
with the originator. These additional steps help to reduce the risk that the originator, if
bankrupt, will either cause the SPE to voluntarily file for bankruptcy or persuade a
bankruptcy court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, to substantively consolidate the
assets and liabilities of the SPE with those of the originator.48
(b)

How Companies Benefit from Securitization

Through the securitization process described above, the SPE raises funds by
issuing securities--usually debt or debt-like securities--and uses the receivables purchased
from the originator to repay investors in the future. The investors, therefore, are
concerned only with the cash flows coming due on these receivables, and care little about
the originator's financial condition as the originator’s financial condition has no bearing
on a properly formed SPE that is separate and distinct from its originator.49
Securitization is most valuable when the cost of funds, reflected in the interest
rate that is necessary to entice investors to purchase the SPE's securities, is less than the
cost of the originator's other, direct sources of funding. The SPE's lower cost of funds is
passed on to the originator through a higher selling price for the originator's receivables.
The goal of securitization, therefore, is to obtain low cost capital market funding by
separating all or a portion of an originator's receivables from the risks associated with the
originator.50
The interest rate necessary to entice investors to purchase the SPE's securities is
often a function of the "rating" that the SPE's debt securities receive. Such ratings are
determined by various independent private companies that have gained widespread
investor acceptance as "rating agencies."51 Given that most investors, except certain
institutional investors in private placement transactions (discussed below), have neither
46

Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 133, 135 (1994).

47

Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 133, 136 (1994).

48

Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 133, 136 (1994).

49

Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 133, 136 (1994).

50

Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 133, 136 (1994).

51

The most well-known and widely accepted rating agencies are Standard and Poor’s Rating Group
(“S&P”) and Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”). Duff and Phelps and Fitch Investors
Service, Inc., are also nationally prominent.” Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization,
1 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 133, 135 n.14 (1994).

17

the time nor the resources to fully investigate the financial condition of the companies in
which they invest, these ratings take on special significance. Investors rely on the
assigned ratings to determine the minimum return that they will accept on a given
investment.52
Companies whose debt securities are rated "investment grade"53 can usually issue
securities in the capital markets at interest rates competitive with, or even lower than,
other generally available sources of funds, such as bank loans. The higher the company's
rating within the investment grade categories, the lower the company's cost of funds. This
reduced cost is a result of the lower interest rate necessary to induce investors to buy the
company's securities.54
A securitization transaction can provide obvious cost savings by permitting an
originator whose debt securities are rated less than investment grade or whose securities
are unrated to obtain funding through an SPE whose debt securities have an investment
grade rating. Even an originator with an investment grade rating may derive benefit from
securitization if the SPE can issue debt securities with a higher investment grade rating
and, as a result, significantly decrease the originator's interest costs.55
One might expect securitization to be of greatest benefit to riskier companies.
This expectation, however, is only partly true. As a company moves toward the extremes
of financial instability and towards the brink of bankruptcy, securitization is less of a
benefit. At this point, the SPE has a higher than normal risk of being challenged by the
originator's trustee in bankruptcy and risk-averse investors tend to avoid these
transactions.56
Asset securitization does, however, afford companies with acceptable risk levels
the possibility of real cost savings. To determine whether an originator will achieve an
overall cost savings from securitization, one must assess the interest savings possible (as
discussed above) against the costs of the securitization transaction. A company
considering securitization should compare (i) the expected differential between interest
payable on non-securitized financing and interest payable on securities issued by an
applicable SPE with (ii) the expected difference in transaction costs between the
alternative funding options. Whether or not the originator will achieve a cost savings
partially depends on the way in which the originator structures the securitization because
transaction costs can vary over a wide range.57
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(c)

Some Controversial Aspects of Asset Securitizations

Both off-balance sheet financing and gain-on-sale accounting, which result from
the peculiarities of SPE accounting are the “hot buttons” with respect to asset
securitizations and are the areas from which most of the controversy in this area stems.58
As securitization evolved into a multi-billion dollar industry, the possible misuse of the
accounting provision for SPE reporting has also attracted the attention of accounting
regulators and standard-setters. In addition, while the early development of SPEs were
focused on the securitization and sale of or transfer of financial assets such as accounts
receivables and mortgage receivables, and later leases, the 1990’s saw further
development of the use of SPEs from the securitization and transfer of many other types
of financial assets, derivatives and commitments, such as long-term commitments to buy
or sell energy (energy derivatives), broadband capacity, metals and mineral rights, etc.59
Despite the accounting questions raised by their use, SPEs have been generally
recognized as legitimate financial tools because of the vital role they have played in
helping several companies raise capital at reasonable costs. In the United States, the
market for asset-backed securities, including mortgage-backed securities (MBS), has
grown rapidly over the last three decades.60 In 2000 for example, more than $400 billion
in MBS and an equal amount in other asset-backed securities were issued. The market
for MBS and ABS is also large in Europe and Asia. For example, about $150 billion of
MBS and ABS capital was raised in Europe in 2000.61
The Proper Accounting Treatment for Asset Transfers
From the very beginning, the use of SPEs by the finance industry has been associated
with questions on what should be the proper accounting for transfer of assets to an SPE.
The questions revolved around whether an SPE was truly independent from the
sponsoring company for the sponsoring company to treat the transfer of its financial
assets to the SPE as a “sale.” For example, if bank A transfers $100 million of its loan
receivables to an SPE at a market value of $110 million, it could recognize a $10 million
gain immediately, provided the transfer qualifies as a sale. Otherwise, the bank is forced
to recognize the gains over the time it takes the SPE to collect on the receivable.62
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In the 1990’s, questions about aggressive use of the gain-on-sale accounting arose
with respect to the SPEs of several financial institutions, including, for example,
Conseco, Inc. The finance arm of Conseco, called Green Tree Financial Corporation, was
acquired by Conseco in mid-1998. Prior to Conseco’s acquisition, Green Tree had made
heavy use of gain-on-sale accounting for several asset transfers. The income recognized
in these transactions had to be later written down by Conseco when the collections on
receivables proved to be far less than initially assumed.63 In early 2000, Conseco took a
$350 million write off, which led to a large drop in Conseco’s stock price. Several socalled “sub-prime” lenders also faced questions during the 1990s on how they accounted
for the transfer of financial assets to SPEs. Examples include Mercy Finance Co. and
Delta Financial Corp.64 These examples illustrate that SPEs can be motivated either by a
genuine business purpose, such as risk sharing among investors and isolation of project
risk from company risk, or by a specific financial disclosure goal65, such as gain-on-sale
accounting treatment to enhance revenue recognition.
Gain-on-sale accounting has been fingered as the main culprit in the manipulation
of earnings and asset values that led to the failures of many sub-prime lenders and
mortgage companies in the 1990s. The accounting objective of earnings management66
was a fundamental motivation for several of the complicated transactions arranged by
Enron with SPEs, which will be discussed in detail in section V.
III.

ACCOUNTING FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES –“pre-Enron”

With a good overview of the most common ways in which SPEs are used, the
next part of the equation is becoming familiar with the proper accounting treatment for
special purpose entities. At the outset, we want to keep focus on the competing tensions
between the issuers that structure these transactions and the standard-setters whose goal is
to insure that SPE transactions are accounted for and disclosed properly.
Generally speaking, with the synthetic lease and asset securitization transactions,
the main motivation is to structure the transaction such that 1) the SPE bears the debt
obligation instead of the sponsoring corporation; and 2) the sponsoring company is not
otherwise required to record the obligation by including the SPE on the sponsor’s
financial statements on a consolidated basis; and 3) if at all possible, the sponsoring
company will record the asset transfer as some form of revenue if the transfer qualifies
for such treatment under GAAP.
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Accordingly, we will take a look at the accounting rules relevant to these aspects
of the transaction. There are at least two sets of accounting rules that are relevant. The
first deals with balance sheet consolidation – whether or not SPEs such as synthetic
leases or asset transfers should be consolidated or reported separately from the
sponsoring entity. The second deals with sales recognition – when should the transfer of
assets to an SPE be reported as a sale and when should they be reported as a secured
financing. These issues typically arise in the asset securitization context in determining
whether the sponsor’s asset transfer to the SPE should be accounted for as a sale or as a
secured financing. Of the two, the more controversial accounting rule is the one dealing
with SPE consolidations. This is addressed next.
A.

SPE Consolidations – When and under what circumstances is consolidation
required – The Consolidation Criteria – “Pre-Enron”

The threshold question with SPEs and the issue with which Enron dealt (although
in most cases improperly) is whether or not the SPE must be reported on a consolidated
basis with the sponsoring company, understanding that one of the primary motivations
behind SPE use is so that the sponsor can raise capital without incurring and recording
additional liabilities in the process.
The explosive growth in the use of SPEs has led to debates among managers,
auditors and accounting standards-setters as to whether and when SPEs should be
consolidated. This is because the intended accounting effects of SPEs can only be
achieved if the SPEs are reported as unconsolidated entities separate from the sponsoring
entity. In other words, the sponsoring company needs to take care and structure the
transaction so that reporting the SPE on a consolidated basis is not required.
In the US, the involvement of the FASB in developing the accounting standards
for SPE consolidation effectively started in 1977, when it issued lease capitalization rules
to control the use of off-balance sheet financing with leases. Corporate management
intent on skirting the new lease capitalization rules appeared to have led to the rapid
evolution of SPEs to do synthetic lease transactions (discussed earlier)67. In the first of
several accounting rules directed at SPEs, in 1984 the Emerging Issues Task Force
(EITF) of the FASB issued EITF no. 84-15, “Grantor Trusts Consolidation.” However,
given the rapid growth of SPEs and their ever-widening range of applications, standard
setters were always a step or two behind and were being reactive rather than proactive in
developing accounting rules to govern proper accounting treatment and use.68
The question of whether a sponsoring company should consolidate an SPE took a
definitive turn in 1990 when the EITF, with the implicit occurrence of the SEC, issued a
guidance called EITF 90-15. This guidance and the related EITF publication called
Topic D-14 Transactions Involving Special Purpose Entities, are currently the primary
sources for the acceptance of the now infamous three percent rule for SPE non67

Bala G. Dharan, Financial Engineering with Special Purpose Entities, in Enron Meltdown: Facts,
Analysis and Recommendations 103, 114 (Julia Brazelton, ed.).

68

Bala G. Dharan, Financial Engineering with Special Purpose Entities, in Enron Meltdown: Facts,
Analysis and Recommendations 103, 114 (Julia Brazelton, ed.).

21

consolidation.69 The rule states that an SPE need not be consolidated if at least three
percent of its equity is owned by outside equity holders who bear ownership risk.
Subsequently, the FASB formalized the above SPE accounting rule with Statement No.
125, issued in June 1996, which was later replaced with Statement No. 140 in September
2000.70
To understand the specific motivation behind the adoption of the three percent
rule, it would be useful to review the regulator’s strong concerns about the potential use
of SPE financial engineering, as can be seen in the following material from EITF Topic
D-14:
“The SEC Observer announced that the SEC staff is become
increasingly concerned about certain receivables, leasing, and other
transactions involving special-purpose entities. Certain characteristics of
those transactions raise questions about whether SPEs should be
consolidated (notwithstanding the lack of majority ownership) and
whether asset transfers to the SPE should be recognized as sales.
Generally, the SEC staff believes that for non-consolidation and sales
recognition by the sponsor or transferor to be appropriate, the majority
owner (or owners) of the SPE must be an independent third party who has
made a substantive capital investment in the SPE, has control of the SPE,
and has substantive risks and rewards of ownership of the assets of the
SPE (including residuals). Conversely, the SEC staff believes that nonconsolidation and sales recognition are not appropriate by the sponsor or
transferor when the majority owner of the SPE makes only a nominal
capital investment, the activities of the SPE are virtually all on the
sponsor’s or transferor’s behalf, and the substantive risks and rewards of
the assets or the debt of the SPE rest directly or indirectly with the sponsor
or transferor”.71
It does not appear from this discussion of the SEC position that the SEC or the
FASB was leaning toward adoption of the loose consolidation standard for SPEs.
Nevertheless, the EITF discussion 90-15, which was subsequently issued, made note of
the acceptance of the three percent rule. Excerpts from EITF 90-15, mentioning the three
percent guideline, are as follows:
“The initial substantive residual equity investment [for the purposes of
non-consolidation of the investment] should be comparable to that
expected from a substantive business involved in similar leasing
transactions with similar risks and rewards. The SEC staff understands
from discussions with Working Group members that those members
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believe that three percent is the minimum acceptable investment. The
SEC staff believes a greater investment may be necessary depending on
the facts and circumstances”72.
An analysis of the above EITF discussion shows that the three percent rule was an
ad hoc solution to a specific issue faced by the FASB’s Emerging Issues Task Force and
was intended as a short-term band-aid, certainly no more than a guideline of “minimum
acceptable investment,” and yet has somehow been transferred by the financing industry
and SPE users into a standard practice and permanent fix. More importantly, the rule, in
many ways, was a major departure from the normal consolidation rules used for other
subsidiaries and entities.73
In the US, we generally require full consolidation if a company owns (directly or
indirectly) 50 percent or more of the outstanding voting shares of an entity. Thus the
three percent rule is a major loosening of the normal consolidation rules74 and arguably a
significant departure from what seems fundamental under GAAP. The motivation (or
perhaps justification) for this seems to have been that the SPEs were restricted in their
activities by the provisions contained in their chartering documents and thus the parent
company could claim lack of control. The parent company only had to show that some
other investors did indeed join the SPE venture with a significant exposure (signified by
the three percent equity investment) in order to make the SPE economically real75 and
thus obviate the need for the sponsor to report the SPE on a consolidated basis.
Given such liberal criteria for avoiding consolidation, in the “Pre-Enron” era, it
would seem that issuers who wished to avoid consolidation of their affiliated SPE’s could
do so without much effort. Accordingly, had Enron followed these rules as prescribed,
their case for innocence would have been much stronger. However, as we will explore in
Section IV, Enron’s problems stemmed from departing from these rules (as liberal as they
were), as they existed, which subsequently prompted changes in the criteria under which
a corporation must consolidate affiliated SPEs. This piece in later sections will examine
what these changes entail.
B.

FAS 140 – [Sales Recognition - A Sale or a Secured Financing?]

The second aspect of the SPE transaction is the accounting treatment at the
juncture where the asset is transferred from the sponsoring entity to the SPE. The two
alternative forms of accounting treatment depending on how the transaction is structured
72
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is either 1) recording the asset transfer as a sale; or 2) recording the asset transfer as a
secured financing. Again, to understand the competing tensions; if the asset transfer
qualifies for sales recognition, then the sponsor can record the proceeds from the transfer
as revenue, which in turn increases net income; an overall financial statement
enhancement.
On the other hand, if the asset transfer does not qualify for sales recognition, the
transaction is then a secured financing. Under this scenario, proper accounting treatment
would be to record the proceeds received in exchange for the transferred assets as a debt
obligation on its balance sheet. Also, the Originator would be required to record those
proceeds as “proceeds from financing activities” on the Originator’s cash flow statement.
Sales Treatment vs. Secured Financing
What determines sales versus secured financing treatment is the terms under
which the asset transfer occurs. Under Financial Accounting Standard 140, Sales
treatment vs. Secured financing is premised upon “control”; who acquires or retains
control of the transferring asset. If the Originator retains some form of control over the
transferred asset, then sales treatment is not proper.76 The idea here is that the ties
between the Originator and the assets must be severed before sale treatment is proper.
Under this set of accounting rules the potential for abuse is evident. The
Originator is looking to reduce his financing costs by isolating a discreet set of assets.
The third party “lender” is looking for a profitable investment, by purchasing assets at a
relative discount and realizing the profit once collection on the transferred assets occurs
and is realized. When structured as designed, everything works well. The Originator
enjoys an infusion of needed capital, and the investor enjoys a profit when the revenues
from the transferred assets are realized.
But what happens when the motivation for such transactions change? What
happens when the motivation for such transactions are merely to achieve accounting
results versus real business objectives? What happens when the transferred assets aren’t
credit worthy at all but the transferor still wants to conduct such transactions to enhance
financial statement presentation through improper sales and revenue recognition? What
would induce a lender into financing an SPE based on assets whose realization was
questionable? This is the backdrop that sets the stage in exploring Enron’s SPE abuse.
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IV.

ENRON ’S SPE ABUSE AND ITS SPE ABUSE – Painting a (false) Financial
Portrait with the SPE Brush
-

Almost overnight, the fall of Enron wiped out $70 billion of shareholder value
and resulted in default on tens of billions of dollars of debt.77
A.

How Did This Happen ? Their Corporate Culture; a Climate for Pushing
the Envelope

The Enron story began with the merger of two gas pipeline companies, Houston
Natural Gas and InterNorth. Its purpose was to be an interstate natural gas pipeline
company.78 Deregulation in the utilities industries created significant challenges for the
new company. Enron was losing its exclusive rights to distribute its products. Kenneth
Lay, the first CEO, believed ENE needed to develop a new business strategy to remain
competitive.79 Lay hired McKinsey & Company, management consultants, to help
develop a new business strategy. Jeffrey Skilling was one of the consultants who began
to work with Enron.80 Skilling proposed a radical plan. Enron would buy gas from
suppliers and resell it to users, charging a small fee for handling the transactions.
Deregulation would allow ENE to take the roll of “middle man”, matching supply and
demand for gas.81 Enron would buy gas from a network of suppliers, sell it to a network
of consumers, and contractually guarantee both the supply and the price. In doing so,
ENE created a new product and a new paradigm for the industry…the energy
derivative.82 Skilling’s plan was successful, and Lay hired him from McKinsey to work
for Enron. It is claimed that Skilling changed the corporate culture at Enron. Skilling
adopted an employee ranking system, the Performance Review Committee (“PRC”).83
The PRC gained the reputation of having been the harshest employee-ranking system in
the country.84 They ranked everyone against their peers. There was no limit on the
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bonuses paid to the top performers. However, up to 15% of the bottom performers were
fired each year.85 Fierce internal competition prevailed and immediate gratification was
prized above long-term potential. Secrecy became the order of the day. The performance
review process created incentives to “do the deal” at all costs.86 Enron had a mandate.
That mandate was to make sure that Enron’s stock price continued to rise by ensuring
that key financial ratios remained on a steady climb. Such was the corporate culture.
The breeding ground that spawned the innovative and creative use of the Special Purpose
Entity that was later revealed to be mere fraud; only exacted at a very high level and done
in a manner that no one had seen before.
B.

How the Enron SPEs were structured, highlighting where Enron Departed
from GAAP

By this point, those who are even remotely interested in what happened with
Enron have read the well documented accounts of the LJM1, and LJM2, partnerships,
Chewco, Raptors, etc. These are the SPEs that made the headlines and were the entities
with which the casual observer is most familiar.87 But those SPEs merely scratched the
surface. Enron’s SPE abuse was pervasive, covering a period from approximately 1999
through 2001 where Enron consummated hundreds of SPE transactions of various forms
and sizes which accounted for a significant portion of their reported revenue during that
same period, right up until Enron filed for bankruptcy in December, 2001.88
(i)

The FAS 140 Transaction in General

This part of the piece examines a specific SPE transaction type that Enron used
repeatedly which, in the year 2000 (i) increased Enron’s reported net income by $351.6
million, 36% of its total reported net income; (ii) increased its reported funds flow from
operations by $1.2 billion, 38% of its total funds flow from operations; and (iii)
improperly kept $1.4 billion of debt off its balance sheet.89 This transaction type was
referred to as the FAS 140 transaction, patterned after and designed to comply with
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Financial Accounting Standard 140 which sets forth the accounting guidelines related to
asset transfers in connection with structured financings.90
In sum, the FAS 140 technique involved Enron’s purported sale of an asset to an
SPE that was not consolidated in Enron’s financial statements. In most cases, the SPE
financed its acquisition of the asset by borrowing 97% of the purchase price and issuing
equity for the remaining 3%, (thus attempting to comply with the 3% equity investment
rule discussed earlier).91 Enron obligated itself to repay the loan through what is referred
to as a Total Return Swap.92 Through the Total Return Swap and the other agreements
employed in this technique, Enron retained substantially all the economic benefits and
risks of asset ownership, notwithstanding the purported sale to the SPE.93 In the
following section, the FAS 140 transaction will be dissected in detail, highlighting where
Enron’s accounting treatment departed from GAAP.
(ii)

The Structure of a Typical FAS 140 Transaction Dissected

A typical Enron FAS 140 Transaction began with the contribution by the Sponsor
of an asset to an “Asset LLC”.94 The Asset LLC would then issue two classes of stock.
Class A and Class B. The class A stock represented the Asset LLC’s voting interests,
whereas the Class B shares represented the economic interest in the LLC.95 The Class A
interests would be issued to the Enron Subsidiary from which the asset was transferred,
and the Class B economic interests would usually be issued to a special purpose entity,
generally a Share Trust (the “Trust”), that Enron would also have a hand in forming96.
The Class B Interests sold to the Trust were entitled to no voting rights but were entitled
to substantially all of the economic interests in the Asset LLC. In exchange for a
payment in the amount of the special distribution to be made by the Asset LLC to the
Sponsor.97
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The Trust financed the purchase price of the Class B Interest by selling an equity
interest in itself to a third party, often an affiliate of one of its Lenders, and by borrowing
under a credit facility provided by those lenders. The equity was generally entitled to be
repaid the amount of its investment plus an annual rate of return. Generally, the amount
of the equity was equal to at least 3% of the purchase price for the Class B Interest, plus
the amount of fees due to the Lenders. The right of the equity-holder to receive payment
with respect to its equity was subordinated to the right of the Lenders to receive the
payment that was advanced under the credit facility. The amounts due to the equityholder were not supported by the Total Return Swaps.98
At the closing of the FAS 140 transaction, upon the Trusts payment to the Asset
LLC of the purchase price for the Class B Interests, the Asset LLC would typically use
those funds to make the special distribution to the Sponsor, thus immediately conveying
the full proceeds of the transaction to the Sponsor.99 A diagram detailing the typical FAS
140 transaction is set forth in Appendix A. –
In looking at the transaction as a whole, perhaps the most important part of the
equation is the movement of money from the lenders through the conduits of the Trust
and the Asset LLC on through to Enron or an Enron subsidiary. And even more
interesting, how Enron accounted for and disclosed that movement in its financial
statements. On the other end of these FAS 140 transactions were the lenders. Typical
participants “loaning” money in these FAS 140 transactions were institutions such as
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), JP Morgan Chase & Co., CitiGroup, and
Morgan Stanley100 (“Lenders”).
The Lenders would transfer money into the Enron formed Share Trusts, who
would in turn transfer the proceeds from the Trust to the Asset LLC, who would in turn
transfer the money and the Class A interest in the Asset LLC in exchange for the
transferred asset (again see diagram at Appendix A).101
(iii)

Forensics of the FAS 140 – Keeping the Lenders Comfortable

It is at this juncture where we stop and do a forensic of the FAS 140 transaction.
In a typical FAS 140 transaction, the values at which Enron would assess these
transferred assets would be anywhere from $10 million to four or five hundred million
dollars.102 Accordingly, with these FAS 140 transactions exists a situation where you
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have a financial institution loaning an Enron formed Share Trust up to $500 million
dollars based on the strength, or creditworthiness of a transferred asset whose realization
is doubtful at best.
The logical inquiry that follows is what would then induce a financial institution
to lend money to an Enron formed share trust under these circumstances? The answer is
in the final piece of the FAS 140 puzzle, the Total Return Swap (the “Swap”). The Swap
in this context is, in essence a guarantee. With the FAS 140 transactions, Enron would
guarantee on behalf of the share trust, the payment’s the share trust was obligated to pay
the Lenders so that whatever short-fall that stemmed from the transferred asset not
generating the requisite cash to service the debt obligation, Enron, through the total return
swap, guaranteed those payments to the Lenders.103 In even the most general of terms,
under GAAP where one party obligates itself to a debt obligation, GAAP requires that the
obligor record and disclose that financial obligation. With Enron, in most of the
transactions structured in this manner, they did not.
(iv)

Improper Revenue Recognition

Next is Enron’s accounting treatment in connection with the transferred asset.
With its FAS 140 transactions, Enron would record these asset transfers as sales thereby
improperly inflating revenue on its income statement.104 Also, depending upon the assets
involved, Enron would recognize cash flow from these activities as cash flows from
operating activities.105 With structured financings, for such accounting treatment to be
proper and in accordance with FAS 140, the transferring entity must completely
relinquish itself from any rights to profits that could be realized from the transferred asset
once the presumptive sale occurs. Likewise, the transaction must be structured in a way
such that the sponsoring entity is absolved from any potential liability if the SPE fails to
realize the payments from the transferred assets.106
A look at a conventional structured finance will illustrate this point. In the
conventional structured finance, once the transferring entity “sales” the account
receivables (for example) to the SPE, it is only proper for the Sponsor to record the
transfer as a sale if and only if the SPE has no recourse against the Sponsor related to the
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transferred assets. If a structured finance is designed in this manner, the sponsor may
record the asset transfer as a sale, and likewise record the cash proceeds from that sale as
either cash received from operations – (depending on whether this was something they
did in the normal course of its operations), or cash proceeds received from investing
activities. Only where the transferring entity has relinquished both the risks and rewards
of ownership is accounting for the transferred assets in this manner proper.
But in Enron’s case, accounting for the asset transfers as sales was not proper for
several reasons. First, Enron maintained control of the transferred asset through its
ownership of the Class A voting membership interests in the LLC to which the asset was
transferred. Second, Enron guaranteed payment through the Total Return Swaps in the
(likely) event the payment streams from the transferred assets were insufficient to repay
the Lenders. The underlying point here again. The rules were clear. Enron merely chose
to depart from those rules to report the financial results they desired, despite the fact that
their reported results veered significantly from what was actually occurring.
(v)

(Improper) Valuation of the Transferred Assets

Another aspect of Enron’s accounting treatment related to its FAS 140
transactions is the questionable circumstances surrounding some of Enron’s valuation of
the transferred assets. Enron’s asset valuations were designed to maximize the “gain on
sale” accounting treatment for those transferred assets. As was discussed earlier, in many
instances, the assets Enron transferred were “A-typical” for use in a structured financing
as these were assets not normally traded on any open market where a fair market value
for those assets could be derived, nor were they your garden variety trade or account
receivables where the time line for payment and valuations are discernible.107
Accordingly, Enron would make its own valuation and attach that Enron assessed value
to those transferred assets. Upon the asset’s transfer, Enron would take the difference
between the Enron assessed value and the actual proceeds from the asset and record the
difference as a gain on sale.108 Therefore, through improper asset valuations coupled with
improper revenue recognition, Enron was able to paint a picture of steady earnings and
cash flow in operations that did not reflect the true financial position of its operations.
C.

Complicit Fraud Rather than Ambiguous Accounting Rules

With these transactions viewed through a transparent lens, the conclusion at
which one arrives is that Enron’s improper SPE reporting had little to do with ambiguity
or lack of accounting literature and guidance in the area. The improper accounting
treatment was intentional and the SPE abuse was merely the method of choice.
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Enron tried to structure and conform these transactions to justify Enron’s desired
accounting treatment. But their desired accounting treatment didn’t reconcile with the
true economic substance of these transactions. “Sale” treatment and revenue recognition
were inappropriate because Enron still maintained both control of and residual
obligations for the transferred assets by virtue of Enron’s ownership of the Class A voting
interests and the total return swaps. But the total return swap guarantees were the only
way that the Lenders would be convinced to loan money to the Share Trusts due to the
poor quality of the assets involved in the transfers.
In concluding this portion of the piece, the overarching point to appreciate is that
Enron’s mis-accounting had nothing to do with ambiguities in the accounting literature
and everything to do with the complicit and coordinated efforts of Enron and those
involved with its financial reporting process to achieve the accounting results that were a
departure from the true economic substance of the underlying transactions that Enron’s
financial reporting purported to reflect.
V.

THE ACCOUNTING AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE – (Treating the
Symptom vs. Tackling the Problem)

The accounting and interpretive guidance that has been enacted in the “postEnron” era are rules that merely treat the symptoms of SPE abuse but fail to address the
actual problem. There have been a number of significant events related to the financial
accounting and disclosure since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The two most
relevant pieces of accounting guidance that addresses these issues are (1) Financial
Accounting Standard 140 (“FAS 140”) Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of
Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities – which gives guidance on when a
transaction may be recognized as a sale, versus a secured borrowing or financing109; and
(2) Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (revised December 2003) – an
interpretation of ARB No. 51 (“Interpretation No. 46(R)”)110, which requires a “risks and
rewards” approach to consolidation of “variable interest entities” as opposed to an
approach based on control by ownership of legal authority. Interpretation No. 46(R) was
designed to address, among other things, some of the concerns with the failure of issuers
under earlier guidance to consolidate certain special purpose entities.
This portion of the piece will focus on these two bodies of accounting literature
and interpretive guidance, explaining first how FAS 140 and FIN 46(R) work, then
highlighting the goals these two pieces of accounting guidance are trying to achieve, and
finally showing that in spite of the intentions of these two pieces of accounting guidance
109
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which in theory seem well meaning and hopefully effective, still fail to address the core
problem that is at the root of Enron and similar SPE abuse cases that have been or will be
perpetrated.
A.

FAS 140

As alluded to earlier, FAS 140 deals with that situation where a corporation (the
“Originator”or “Sponsor”) transfers assets to a special purpose entity. The key issue to
resolve being whether that transfer can be treated as a sale, which bolsters financial
reporting, or as a secured financing which would prevent the Originator from not only
recording the asset transfer as a sale, but would require the Originator to recognize a debt
obligation as well.111 In essence, in accordance with FAS 140, the Originator may record
the asset transfer as a “sale” if and only if all the following conditions are met.
a. The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor-put
presumptively beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in
bankruptcy or other receivership.
b. Each transferee has the right to pledge or exchange the assets it receives, and
no condition both constrains the transferee from taking advantage of its right
to pledge or exchange and proves more than a trivial benefit to the transferor.
c. The transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred assets
through either (1) an agreement that both entitles and obligates the transferor
to repurchase or redeem them before their maturity or (2) the ability to
unilaterally cause the holder to return specific assets.112
Cutting through the accounting verbiage, the key question to determine is whether
or not the Originator has relinquished both the risks and rewards of ownership of the
transferred assets. Only when the bond between the assets and the Originator has been
severed, is it proper for the Originator to recognize such transfers as sales. When using
these accounting principles as the backdrop for assessing a representative Enron
transaction, what results is accounting guidance that is clear as to its criteria, and a
corporation, irrespective of such clarity, recording transactions in direct contravention of
such guidance and clarity.
Enron’s Departure from FAS 140 and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
As discussed at length in the previous section, Enron transferred assets to the
Asset LLC and improperly recorded such assets as sales, in spite of the fact that Enron
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failed to relinquish both the risks and rewards of ownership in two ways. The first by
virtue of guaranteeing the Trust’s payment obligations to its Lenders, by virtue of the
total return swaps, entered into in connection with these transactions113, and second by
virtue of Enron maintaining voting control through its ownership of the Class A
membership interests.114 Where the Originator of the transferred asset guarantees
payment against the collection or realization of the transferred assets, the risks and
rewards of ownership have not been relinquished and recording the transaction as a sale
is not proper. Again, the key points to emphasize here is that the problems with the
transactions had nothing to do with ambiguities or gaps in the accounting literature, and
everything to do with Enron management being narrowly focused on distorting its
financial picture.
B.

FINACIAL INTERPRETATION 46(R) – The New Consolidation Criteria
[Changes in the Financial Reporting Regime since the Passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act –An attempt to close the 3% loophole and require
consolidation based on economic substance vs. legal form.]

FIN 46(R) in essence deals with the situation where Company A has some sort of
Financial Interest in Company B. FIN 46(R) outlines when and under what
circumstances, the relationship between Company A and Company B is such that
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles would require the two to be reported on a
consolidated basis. The usual investment with which we are most familiar would be
Company A’s investment in Company B through stock ownership. Prior to guidance
that was developed in the SPE arena, entities would be required to consolidate only in the
instance where Company A had majority ownership in Company B through A’s
ownership of B’s stock. This test was generally treated as a “bright-line” test where
consolidation would be required only at the point where Company A was a majority
owner of Company B’s Stock. (i.e. greater than 50%).115
As a result of this bright line test, corporations would avoid the consolidation
requirement by controlling the entity through some means other than stock ownership and
would avoid consolidation, thereby keeping both the assets and more importantly, any
underlying liabilities off Corporation A’s books.116 As was discussed earlier, with
respect to SPEs, the consolidation criteria was loosened further with EITF 90-15, where
the sponsoring corporation could avoid consolidation if the SPE equity owner has made
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an initial substantive residual capital investment that is at risk during the entire term of
the lease.117 FIN 46(R) among other things is aimed at closing this loophole.
Variable interest entities include SPEs and can be generally described as entities
in which the equity investment at risk does not provide its holders with the characteristics
of a controlling financial interest or is not sufficient for the entity to finance its activities
without additional subordinated financial support.118 These characteristics are meant to
identify arrangements in which control of the entity would not be achieved through
voting stock ownership, but through some other method.119 FASB Interpretation No.
46(R) requires consolidation of a variable interest entity by a party that has a majority of
the risks and rewards associated with the entity.120 Interpretation No. 46 also establishes
a methodology for determining which party associated with a VIE should consolidate the
VIE. Essentially, the requirement is that the party exposed to a majority of the variation
in the outcome of the performance of a VIE, both positive and negative, should
consolidate the VIE, because such exposure is likely to be indicative of control.121
Interpretation No. 46(R) refers to such a party as the “primary beneficiary” of the VIE.122
An issuer’s involvement or interest in with a VIE can manifest itself in debt
instruments, guarantees, service contracts, written put options, total return swaps, etc.123
These arrangements with a VIE can put the issuer in a position akin to an equity holder in
that the issuer bears the same risks and rewards of the VIE as an equity holder would.
For example, consider an issuer that owns 49% of the voting stock of another entity and
is the sole guarantor of debt of the entity. Before Interpretation No. 46(R), such an issuer
may not have been required to consolidate the other entity based upon voting control.
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However, subsequent to the promulgation of Interpretation No. 46(R), if this same entity
is deemed to be a VIE, then the issuer would likely be required to consolidate due to the
issuer’s additional risk of loss from the outstanding guarantee.124
C.

Moving Forward with the New Accounting – Lack of Accounting Rules Were
Not the Problem

Having set the salient accounting guidance out in some detail, an assessment can
now be made as to how effective such new guidance would have been or will be in
preventing “Enron-like” SPE abuse. The crux of FIN46(R) is a redefining of the criteria
under which an entity should be reported on a consolidated basis. FIN 46(R) switches
that criteria from one where consolidation was required only when the SPE in question
did not have at least a 3% equity investment from an outside third party to now requiring
the entity that has the majority of risk or rewards related to that SPE to report that SPE on
a consolidated basis.125
In theory, such a change has merit. Arguably, with a broadened set of criteria
under which consolidation would be required, financial reporting in this area would be
more transparent as entities that would have avoided consolidation prior to FIN46(R)
would now be pulled onto the balance sheet on a consolidated basis thereby resulting in a
more transparent and accurate representation of a corporation’s true financial picture. In
practice, however, there is evidence suggesting that such measures as expanding the
consolidation criteria would from an overall standpoint result in an exercise in futility.
First, when we look at what happened at Enron, as discussed earlier, Enron’s
failure to consolidate or otherwise disclose obligations that it otherwise had, had nothing
to do with any ambiguity or shortcomings in the accounting literature. What Enron did
with most of the SPEs that it used was simple fraud.126 For example when we refer back
to the FAS 140 example discussed earlier, we can see that Enron violated the then
existing accounting guidance on a number of fronts. First, contrary to FAS 140, Enron
recorded the asset transfers as sales even though Enron retained control of the transferred
assets through their Class A voting membership interests.
Second, Enron failed on several occasions to record the debt obligations related to
the FAS 140 transactions which was in fact Enron’s obligation. Again, the failure to
disclose had nothing to do with shortfalls in the accounting literature, but more so having
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to do with Enron’s intent on obfuscation and omission. The Total Return Swaps into
which Enron entered in connection with these transactions were Enron’s unequivocal
guarantee to repay the debt in the event the cash value of the monetized assets was not
realized. The major point to emphasize here is that no accounting guidance is going to
counteract the deliberate intent to obfuscate and defraud.
Further, and equally important, there is evidence to suggest that new accounting
guidance will only cause issuers to restructure their transactions once again to avoid the
new accounting criteria.127 In anticipation of the implementation of Interpretation No.
46(R), a number of entities have restructured their arrangements with potential VIEs such
that they would not require consolidation.128 The SEC notes anecdotally that many
arrangements with potential VIEs were restructured such that the entity either would not
be considered a VIE or such that no party would be required to consolidate the VIE. The
effect of such changes is difficult to measure. However, in some cases, it appears that the
changes made involved substantive changes to the economics of the variable interests or
to the decision-making capabilities of the investors, while in other cases, the changes may
have been less substantive.129
D.

Implementation Costs

Although Interpretation No. 46(R) arguably constitutes an improvement over the
previously existing consolidation guidance, a number of interpretive questions remain.
Many users of Interpretation No. 46(R) find it theoretically and practically challenging to
apply.130 In fact, the actual application of FIN 46(R) is complicated and time consuming
to implement. Further, the calculations under FIN 46(R) have to be recalculated each
reporting period as one’s variable interests in an entity may change between financial
reporting periods.131 Currently, the FASB is considering ways to resolve an issue
originally discussed by the EITF in issue 04-07, Determining Whether an Interest Is a
Variable Interest in a Potential Variable Interest Entity. A consensus on this EITF issue
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may change how some issuers apply Interpretation No. 46(R).132 But in its current form
properly applying FIN 46(R) will be a winding maze through which issuers are now
being forced to navigate.
The resulting situation is that company resources will be diverted toward making
sure their variable interest entity transactions are in compliance with FIN 46(R).
Although not quantified in this piece, we already see the added burden upon a
corporation’s internal accounting function in calculating and accounting for its variable
interest entities. Likewise the issuer will incur additional costs to be paid to the issuer’s
public accountants as they will require additional man hours to sort through and
determine whether the issuer’s VIE disclosures are proper.
It is understood that proper financial reporting should not be compromised or
sacrificed just because additional costs will be incurred. The additional costs would be
justified, however IF the additional burdens were focused on the identified problem. But
here it is arguable whether FIN 46(R) is or will effectively address the problem of SPE
abuse.
VI.

A STEP BACK – A TIME TO ASSESS

It is human nature to, when we find something that we perceive as broken, to
utilize the most expedient measures at our disposal to fix the problem. Here, is no
exception. But what happens when the focus of the problem has been redirected from the
weapon (meaning the special purpose entity) to the one’s pulling the trigger. Quite
naturally, what should come from a refocusing of the problem is a refocusing of the
means by which that problem should be addressed.
It is understandable that during the rising tide of public outcry in the wake of the
Enron debacle, there was a collective call for action to be taken, and Congress and the
relevant standard-setters in the accounting world in their quest to stem that tide and
restore investor confidence in our public markets reacted quickly with the passing of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Likewise, the FASB followed suit with its revamping of the rules
on consolidation with the issuance of FIN 46(R). But now that the investing public‘s
collective memory of the Enron “sting” has faded, we have the luxury of taking a
thoughtful look at what is really happening in cases like Enron, and accordingly take a
more focused approach at trying to prevent future Enrons from occurring in the future.
A.

Scope of the Problem

First and foremost, the standard-setters need to make a more focused assessment
of the problem. Is Enron like SPE abuse widespread and prevalent or was Enron a
unique and isolated set of circumstances? How wide spread is special purpose entity use
132
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in its various forms? And more importantly how widespread is the abuse of special
purpose entities? Narrower still, is anyone, other than Enron, engaging in the type of
deliberate, contrived, prevalent, proprietary and abusive use of special purpose entities
that Enron used to misrepresent its financial position? Answers to these questions would
go a long way in crafting a more pointed and tailored response to curtailing SPE abuse.
Research reveals that there are some instances of SPE abuse occurring in the “postEnron” era, but nothing as wide-spread, complex, and contrived as what occurred with
Enron.133
B.

The SEC Attempts to Address the Problem

To its credit the SEC set out to do something along these lines, that is, attempt to
quantify the extent to which public companies are utilizing Special Purpose Entities. But
their research did not take it as far as trying to determine SPE abuse. In 2005, the SEC
issued a report that addressed two primary questions: (1) the extent of off-balance sheet
arrangements including the use of special purpose entities; and (2) whether current
financial statements of issuers transparently reflect the economics of off-balance sheet
arrangements.134 The Report was informative and insightful and shed light on a number
of different and important aspects as they relate to Special Purpose Entities and how they
are being disclosed amongst the approximately 10,100 publicly held companies in the
U.S.135
Regarding the first question, the mandate was to assess the extent to which public
companies were using off-balance sheet arrangements, and more to the point, special
133

For example – An online LexisNexis search for companies engaging in SPE abuse yielded the
following:
1.

PNC Financial, a leading US bank, agreed to pay $115 Million in penalties and restitution to
spare itself from prosecution over its efforts to hide hundreds of millions of dollars in nonperforming assets. The agreement marks the SEC’s first enforcement action involving the
misuse of special-purpose vehicles. Joshua Chaffin & Gary Silverman, PNC Pays Fine to
Escape Threat of Prosecution, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 3, 2003 (USA Edition).

2.

The world’s largest insurance company, American International Group, was facing a criminal
investigation by the U.S Justice Department into allegations that it helped a major banking
client move bad loans off its books. The allegation was that AIG sold PNC (Pittsburgh-based
PNC Financial Services Group) as the idea of creating special-purpose entities for these bad
loans – The allegations alleges that PNC avoided consolidating $762 Million in bad loans
onto its balance sheet, effectively inflating its profit by $155 Million. PNC agreed to pay $90
Million to compensate shareholders and $25 Million in penalties to state-related charges after
the Justice Department said that the special-purpose entities in question did not qualify for
non-consolidation and therefore should have been included in its financial statements. Charlie
Gibson, AIG Facing Criminal Probe Over Loan Deal, EVENING STANDARD, Sept. 30, 2004.
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purpose entities. The idea being, if the use was wide-spread and pervasive versus narrow
and hardly used, that assessment would drive, to some extent, the necessary approach to
enforce effectively the use of, accounting for, and disclosures of special purpose entities.
The SEC did a number of empirical studies, collecting data through looking at a stratified
sample of publicly held companies and then published the results of those empirical
studies in a report (the “Report”).136
It was hoped that the Report would uncover the types of off-balance Special
Purpose Entities being structured by public issuers. In other words, the hope and
expectation was that the Report would convey either “yes” there are a myriad of
corporations that are using Special Purpose Entities in a fraudulent and abusive manner
similar to Enron. Or “no” the abuse of the SPE structure is not wide-spread such that we
need not be alarmed nor enact more legislation to address the problem. But the Report,
not surprisingly, did not yield such clear results or conclusions.
Instead, the Report was broader in nature. Data on these issues were reported in a
number of different ways from which different conclusions could be drawn. But before
discussing and analyzing the data itself, it is important to point out that at the point in
time that the study was done, FIN 46(R) was still in its fledgling stages. Therefore, a
number of the studies’ participants at the time they were picked as part of the sample may
not have fully matriculated the mandates of FIN46(R) into their financial reporting. That
notwithstanding, the Report itself gives us some interesting information.
One of the first empirical studies outlined in the Report was the “Anticipated
Effects of Adoption of Interpretation No. 46(R) Present in Annual 10-K Filings.”137 The
Report took a stratified sample of large and small issuers. Of the stratified sample
comprised of 200 large and small issuers, the study revealed that 38 percent of those
sampled reporting issuers reported that the effect of adopting FIN 46(R) was not material
or not expected to be material.138 The study also revealed that less than 4% of the 200
issuer sample reported that the impact of adopting Interpretation No. 46(R) was not
material or not expected to be material.139 An extrapolation of the findings from the
sample to the approximate population of active U.S. issuers suggests that less than 1% of
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the issuers in the population would expect the effect of the Interpretation to be
material.140
Statistical data can often be interpreted in a number of different ways. The data
revealed in the report is no exception. As state earlier, roughly 38% of the 200 issuers
sampled stated that the impact of FIN 46(R) was either not material or not expected to be
material. Only 3.5% of the Sample reported that the impact of adopting FIN 46(R) was
material or was expected to be material for any VIEs.141
Among other things, a few possible inferences can be drawn. First is the distinct
possibility that improper corporate use of Special Purpose Entities is not pervasive;
especially to the point where revamping the criteria under which consolidating such
entities is required. Second, and perhaps the more plausible explanation, is the fact that
FIN 46(R) will just be another accounting guideline around which corporations will
structure their transactions to achieve their desired results. That being either
consolidation or non-consolidation.
The new accounting guidance related to
consolidating VIEs is a continuation of the cycle that has brought us to this juncture in
the first place. The SEC and the Financial Accounting Standards Board enacts
accounting guidance and interpretations to shore up perceived weaknesses or shortfalls in
financial reporting, and then corporations, in response, merely restructure their
transactions to circumnavigate the matter. A better mousetrap is built, followed by a
better mouse to avoid the “trap”.
From such a pattern the inferential leap would not be so large to suggest that
public companies’ in response to FIN 46(R) will react the same way. Corroborating this
assertion are sentiments the SEC expressed in its Report. The Report suggests that some
of the low numbers related to corporate consolidations in response to FIN 46(R) is
attributed to issuers being pre-emptive in their financial reporting and restructuring their
off balance sheet or variable interest entity transactions to avoid reporting such entities on
a consolidated basis.142 Although the report does note that if issuers are changing the way
their SPEs are structured such that they no longer control the SPE or are not the primary
beneficiary of the expected returns or losses, interpretation 46(R) will have improved
financial reporting even if there is not a significant increase in the frequency of
consolidation of SPE consolidation.143
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These are just possible inferences that the data might suggest, not definitive
conclusions. But what is certain, is that the Report did not reveal and purposely did not
try to reveal the extent to which potential SPE abuse similar or akin to Enron was being
practiced by other issuers. Understandably and arguably this would be hard information
to ferret. Now, however such information should be much easier, given that we now
know for what to look.
Bringing the analysis full circle, the question is begged – does such legislation
move the ball any more down the field in addressing the type of SPE abuse similar to
Enron? Though unclear, the answer is likely to be no. As stated earlier, what we saw
with Enron was not a situation where accounting guidelines were written such that Enron
could follow the letter of the law while breaking the spirit of the law. Enron made
intentional efforts to circumnavigate the accounting rules then in existence with the
specific intent of achieving accounting results while obfuscating the true underlying
substance of those transactions. Accordingly, the main point to emphasize here is that in
Enron’s case, accounting guidance or lack thereof was not the problem. It is therefore
counterintuitive to think that ADDITIONAL accounting guidance would then be the
solution. Arguably, those persons set on breaking the prior rules will break any new
legislation or guidance as well, if that is in fact their intent.
Of course the counter-argument would then be that revised accounting guidelines
now make it more difficult to perpetrate the accounting fraud that Enron perpetrated
because the criteria and circumstances under which consolidation is required is much
broader, with higher thresholds for non-consolidation which means a lot less “wiggleroom”. One may speculate how the use of SPEs under FIN 46(R) will work. More than
likely, those corporations that are in the “grey-area” with respect to SPEs may error on
the side of caution and decide either to comply with the rule, or not do the transaction at
all. On the other hand, it is not a stretch to conclude that those corporations that are
intent on committing financial fraud will do so, regardless of what the rules are. The
thought here is that once the intent to circumnavigate the rule is there, the “how” is
merely a formality.
VII. SEC INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE FINANCIAL REPORTING
TRANSPARENCY- (A Critique) – Better Mousetrap, Better Mouse –
The difficulties in improving financial reporting related to SPEs not withstanding,
merely because the task or problem at hand is formidable does not mean that attempts
should not be made to fix them. Quite the contrary. In fact, in the later part of the
Report, it cites a number of proposed and current initiatives aimed at improving accuracy
and transparency in financial reporting. Whether or not such attempts will meet their
desired objectives remains to be seen. But evidence suggests that while these efforts may
enjoy success in the short run, the long-term prospects for success may be minimal if at
all. This Section looks at some of the proposed initiatives and will critique their
likelihood of success, pointing out some of the challenges that the proposed effort will
face.
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A.

SEC Recommendation: Eliminate or at least reduce Accounting- Motivated
Structured Transactions

The Report’s first suggestion is to eliminate or reduce accounting-motivated
structured transactions. Accounting-motivated structured transactions normally involve
transactions that are structured in an attempt to achieve accounting results that do not
mirror the underlying economics of the transaction .144 The very glaring example being
the accounting motivated transactions Enron structured to boost its earnings and cashflow numbers but were quite different in economic substance. The Report discusses the
need to eliminate or at least reduce the extent to which issuers are engaging in
accounting-motivated transactions.
The goal of eliminating accounting motivated transactions in theory is a sound
one. Recording accounting results that are contrary to their true economic substance
threatens one of the foundational bricks upon which the capital markets are built. So, in
theory the extent to which such practices could be reduced, if not eliminated altogether, is
a step in the right direction. But in practice, eliminating or even reducing accounting
motivated transactions is a difficult task in part due to the reasons discussed next.
Discordant Incentives – Management’s Disincentives in Disclosing Adverse
Financial Information – The Hurdle to Achieving Fairly Presented Financial
Statements
One of the big obstacles to fair financial reporting that either seems to be
underappreciated, merely accepted as a given, or perhaps not considered at all, are the
discordant incentives between management that is tasked to report accurate financial
information within material respects and the potentially adverse consequences that
management may suffer personally or individually as a result of reporting such adverse
financial information.
When we look at the compensation structure of upper level management at many
large publicly held companies, we see some recurring themes. Most of these upper level
managers receive a large part of their compensation in the form of bonuses based on the
company’s profitability or the performance of its stock.145 The stock awarded may be
incentive based, performance based, etc.146 Also, bonuses and more importantly,
144
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continued employment can be tied to the earnings numbers their respective company’s
report.147
Given such a dynamic, we can see the competing tensions being put on the
financial reporting process. The resulting situation is one in which you have management
dealing with the difficult situation of disclosing adverse financial information that could
have a direct adverse impact on their own personal situations. In an ideal world we
would like to think that these officers, in adhering to their fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty would not let such possible personal consequences compromise their professional
integrity. But the reality of the situation is that it can and often does.148 With this
dynamic ever-present each and every reporting period, we see the inherent vulnerability
in the reporting process which was likely integral to some of the incredibly large scale
accounting scandals that have occurred to date.
It is these divergent incentives that create the competing tensions between
standard setters looking for more transparency in financial reporting and management
that is sensitive to how such transparent information, when such information is negative,
will effect the company’s share price in general and more specifically the impact that
such negative information will have on their own personal financial situations as they
relate to the corporations over which they preside as fiduciaries.
As long as these tensions exists, standard-setters will in large part be relying on
management to “do the right thing” even in those instances where doing the right thing
could have an adverse effect on them personally. Granted, we would like to think that
one’s commitment to one’s fiduciary duties as an officer or director, one’s personal and
professional integrity, or even one’s moral compass would place the requisite checks and
balances on doing the right thing. But a cursory glance at the Wall Street Journal and the
inundation of corporate scandals tells us otherwise.149 Until this dynamic of divergent
incentives is remedied, it is logical to conclude that accounting motivated transactions
will continue.
B.

SEC Recommendation:
Reporting

Improve Communication Focus in Financial

The SEC also calls for a paradigm shift in the whole idea behind communicating
through financial reporting. As the Report notes, “…An unfortunate effect of the large
volume and complexity of financial reporting requirements is that many accountants,
147

2005 Home Depot Proxy Statement, Executive Compensation section,
http://ir.homedepot.com/downloads/hd2005proxy.pdf (page 36) (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).

148

For example, the Houston Chronicle printed an article that summarized some of the more recent and
high profile scandals. Listed among them were Adelphia Communications Corporation, WorldCom
Inc., Tyco International Ltd., and HEALTHSOUTH Corp. Enron Began a Wave of Scandals:
Collapses changed the way that companies do business, Hous. Chron., Jan. 27, 2006, available at
www.chron.com/cs/cda/printstory.mpl/special/enron/3616142 (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).

149

Enron Began a Wave of Scandals: Collapses changed the way that companies do business, Hous.
Chron., Jan. 27, 2006, available at www.chron.com/cs/cda/printstory.mpl/special/enron/3616142 (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006).

43

lawyers, and others seem to view the goal of financial reporting as achieving technical
compliance with the rules without regard to communicating effectively to investors.”150
The Report further notes that “…if all participants in the process came at financial
reporting with a view of complying with the objectives of the guidance and clearly and
transparently communicating material information to investors, significant improvements
would occur even if none of the other recommendations in this Report were to be
adopted. Conversely, the focus on seeming technical compliance results in a tendency to
only make improvements when new rules or standards required those improvements.
This burdens the standard-setters with the responsibility for driving all improvements,
and investors with the responsibility for deciphering reports that are not written
clearly.151
The Report also noted another recurring practice in its review of selected issuer’s
financial statements, and that was the practice of spreading relevant and connected pieces
of information in several places with little explanation of how the various disclosures
related to each other or to the amounts represented in the financial statements.152
Technical compliance versus clear, concise and meaningful communications: the
crux of the matter when talking about improved communication in financial reporting.
Full and fair disclosure is one of the cornerstones of investor protection under the federal
securities laws. If a prospectus fails to communicate information clearly, investors do
not receive that protection…A major challenge facing the securities industry and its
regulators is assuring that financial and business information reaches investors in a form
they can read and understand.”153 But again the dynamics involved make this
proposition for financial reporting a difficult one. Take for instance the following
example. Something of an adverse nature occurs within a corporation. Depending on the
gravity of the event, a meeting is called, the CEO, the CFO, the Board of Directors if they
are available, Corporate counsel, the company’s outside counsel as well as their public
accountants have assembled in the company’s “war room” to discuss how such news
should be handled. The securities laws mandate that material information related to the
corporation must be disclosed. In any number of these meetings that occur across the
country with publicly held companies, the discussion can be interesting. What goes on is
a sort of verbal ballet, where the very smart lawyers, CEO’s, etc., deliberate a way to
“disclose” the information without really disclosing the information. The end result of
these meetings and deliberations are tepidly worded phrases, buoyed by mitigating facts,
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white washed in superfluous verbiage. The goal of which is to meet the technical
disclosure requirements while at the same time, burying the essence of such information
in tersely worded phrases or dispersing the information throughout the filing such that
while the information may technically be there, effective communication of what is
actually occurring is not.
The Competing Dynamics
As alluded to earlier, the practice of obfuscation through lack of clarity stems
from the competing dynamics. Management understands that they have to comply with
the disclosure rules under the federal securities laws. But at the same time management
is aware of the possible adverse affects such information may have on the corporation’s
stock price and the implications this may have on them personally once the news is
disseminated. The competing incentives that create the tension that results in technical
compliance versus real true meaningful communication.
Once again, this dynamic puts tension on the free-flow of material information. It
is understood that there are disclosure laws in place, new legislation passed such as the
Sarbanes Oxley Act, stiffens penalties for violators which is resulting in jail time for
offenders.154 Not to mention the fiduciary duties for directors and officers and finally, the
mere moral and ethical obligations about simply doing the right thing. In theory, all these
layers of legal protections, inhibitors and moral obligations should insulate financial
reporting from the problems that have occurred. But more than likely, the problems that
we are seeing with financial reporting are likely to continue as human decision making is
not always based on the unyielding obligation to follow both the letter and the spirit of
the law, but on a more deeply rooted desire for self-preservation. The emotional reaction
to self preservation is akin to how we handled matters in our youth when we did
something we weren’t supposed to do. If we didn’t tell our parents what we did then we
wouldn’t get in trouble.
But Just as our parents eventually became aware of the offending conduct then,
such is the case now as adults. And just as the consequences were exacerbated then by
our attempt at a cover up, so is the case as adults when the truth eventually comes to
light. In hindsight almost inevitably up front disclosure likely would have been the better
choice for self-preservation both as children and as adults. But again the emotional
response of self-preservation is to “cover up” the truth and hope nobody (ever) finds out
about it.
Sometimes, both as children and as adults, the truth stays buried indefinitely and
the consequences are avoided. From a self-preservation stand-point the choice of “nondisclosure” makes most sense where the offense is non-recurring, i.e. a “one-time”
instance. But where the offenses are recurring or ongoing (such as Enron’s fraudulent
reporting which occurred on both a quarterly and an annual basis), it would seem like the
long-term goal of self-preservation would be to confess and accept the consequences
which hopefully would be mitigated by the forth right behavior. All of this makes sense
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from a hind-sight logical, unemotional perspective. But putting one’s self in the shoes of
an Enron executive, the pressure put upon them by their constituencies, the ramifications
of reduced shareholder value, etc., the “gut” reaction prevailed and the obfuscation
continued until it snowballed so large that discovery of their improprieties were
inevitable.
The overall point to understand here is that as long as the current dynamic of
leaving the responsibility of financial reporting in the hands of those who may be
adversely affected personally, the competing tensions of discordant incentives will
continue to put pressure on clear and meaningful financial reporting. And the issues of
fraud, obfuscation, and omission of material financial information is likely to continue
until this “mis-alignment” is somehow rectified.
C.

SEC Agenda Item: Continue Work on Consolidation Policy

As was discussed earlier, the consolidation decision is typically based on whether
or not control exists, with the determination of control generally based on legal ability to
control the entity. However, it is possible to control effectively an entity without having
legal control. An issuer that owns 49% of the voting shares of an entity whose shares are
otherwise widely distributed would almost certainly be able to set policy for that other
entity, but currently would not be deemed to control that other entity for accounting
purposes.”155
“While the FASB discontinued its broad project on effective control,
Interpretation No. 46(R) is an attempt to deal with SPEs by creating a consolidation test
for those entities that is meant to identify which entity has the majority of the exposure to
variations in performance and in turn, effective control. However, because that test is so
different from the test used to determine consolidation of other entities, a new series of
structures that straddle the lines between consolidation approaches has sprung up, and
various structures have been designed to work around the guidance in Interpretation No.
46(R). The Staff believes that more time should be taken to evaluate the results of
Interpretation 46(R) and to allow the development of interpretive guidance that may
assist in its application. Several projects currently being undertaken by the EITF and the
FASB staff may provide such guidance.156
The current consolidation guidance is complicated, despite the consistent
objective of requiring consolidation when an investor controls another entity. The SEC
believes additional standard setting efforts related to consolidation should be focused on
whether there are ways to achieve the objectives with less complex guidance. In
addition, once the questions regarding Interpretation No.46(R) have been more fully
addressed, the FASB may also wish to consider whether it should again explore the use
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of effective, rather than legal, control to guide all consolidation decisions. Finally
additional work holds the promise of promoting further convergence between
consolidation guidance in the US GAAP and the consolidation guidance in the
International Accounting Standards Board’s standards.157
It is without question that the more changes that the standard-setters make which
causes issuers to account for their off-balance sheet transactions in such a way that the
form of those transactions reflect the structure’s economic substance, the better off
theoretically we will be. Such efforts are to be applauded as they are well intentioned
and could lead to better and more accurate financial reporting in the future.
But at the same time, we must not let such changes create a sense of false
euphoria and lull us into thinking that those efforts will be the panacea to the issues
related to SPE abuse. Within the depths of all of this empirical data, within the depths of
the intellectual discussion surrounding the issues related to SPEs, what seems to get only
minimal attention or discussion is the fact that the SPE abuse Enron perpetrated was
simply fraud with the SPE being the entity of choice, in part due to its inherently complex
nature. But in spite of their complexity, had the true economic substance and nature of
these entities been disclosed properly and in accordance with GAAP, analysts, investors,
and shareholders alike all would likely have seen that such transactions were problematic
and investors could have reacted and altered their investment decisions accordingly.
Again, lack of sufficient accounting guidance was not the problem.
VIII. SUGGESTIONS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH –
How to prevent another Enron
How to prevent another Enron; literally the billion dollar question. Before a
discourse even commences on this subject, we must first acknowledge that any efforts to
prevent another Enron would be just that, an effort. When we weigh the resources of the
Securities and Exchange Commission against the some 10,000 plus publicly held
companies out there, abuses such as this and others will continue to happen.
One maxim that we as an investing public have had is the notion that we can
legislate people into doing the right thing. When the fact of the matter is that is difficult
if not impossible to do. No matter what type of law, regulation, or statute that is put in
place, if an individual or a group of people are intent on breaking that law, they will.
When we look at Enron and examine in detail what was going on with Enron and its use
of SPEs, the problem had nothing to do with ambiguities in the accounting or statutory
literature with respect to SPEs. The problem was with unethical, and criminal behavior.
The problem was that you had people in positions of power and public trust who made
deliberate decisions to abuse that power and violate that trust. At the time those people
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knew quite well what the law was and what it was they needed to do to comply with that
law. Lack of clarity in the law was not the problem.
If we take the above assessment and analysis as true, the natural inquiry then is
what then should be done or what should we have done in response to the Enron’s,
Adelphia’s and WorldCom’s of the world? How then could they have been prevented?
And how do we make sure that another Enron, WorldCom or Adelphia doesn’t occur
again? Well, that is the question that lawmakers have been contemplating for the better
part of 4 ½ years as they carefully examine Sarbanes Oxley’s effectives as the Act’s
provisions take a foot hold and matriculate themselves into corporate America’s
collective culture. Observations from high ranking officials involved with standard
setting and regulation suggest that the Act’s provisions have been effective in improving
financial statement disclosure, corporate governance, and auditor independence.158
The response to this empirical data though is whether financial statement
disclosure, corporate governance, and auditor independence improved because of
Sarbanes Oxley or in spite of Sarbanes Oxley. The argument here could go either way.
Some would say that the Act’s provisions were instrumental in bringing about much
needed reform in corporate governance, auditor independence, and financial statement
disclosure. On the other hand, others contend that the improvement in these areas are
merely due to the fact that issuers are now operating in the “post-Enron” environment of
heightened scrutiny. The only real response to either school of thought is that time will
tell.
It is at this juncture that we can acknowledge that the efforts that the standardsetters are making may prevent those issuers who may be tempted to straddle the
“financial reporting fence” from actually doing so. The post-Enron climate in which we
find ourselves where everyone for the most part seems to be minding their “P’s” and
“Q’s”. That alone may be enough to keep issuers from even coming close to the line.
But eventually the bright lights of public scrutiny will dim. The memory of Enron will
likely be there for some time, but the pain from its sting will eventually subside. And
when the bright lights do dim and the climate again reverts back to one where issuers for
the most part will be left to their own recognizance, what decisions will be made then?
As we have seen, when smart people wish to circumnavigate the rules, they will find a
way to do so. Money and power; opiates proven to succeed in clouding judgment, and
eroding the core values and ethical judgement of otherwise law abiding people.
There is no set of accounting guidance and literature out there that will prevent
this type of occurrence from happening. And this is the very type of accounting abuse
that we do want to avoid and prevent. But as much as we want to convince ourselves
otherwise, the making of better mousetraps likely will not do that. All better mousetraps
will likely do is cause the evolution of better mice that will be genetically improved to
avoid such traps. As the SEC has already noted, there is evidence that many issuers were
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preemptive with respect to FIN 46(R) and already commenced to restructuring their offbalance sheet transactions to avoid consolidation under the new guidance159
What then is the Solution?
If there is any good that came from a situation like Enron, it’s that collectively as
an investing public, we are better versed on accounting fraud of this nature. The financial
markets, the analysts, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the public
accountants have all by now absorbed many of the intricacies of SPE abuse. In short, we
now know for what to look and efforts can be focused accordingly.
So how do we prevent another Enron from happening again? The standard-setters
and the gatekeepers, in spite of all the accounting and disclosure reform, need to
appreciate with what they are dealing. A deficiency or a perceived deficiency in the
accounting rules is not the problem. The problem is persons that seek to obfuscate, omit,
and fraudulently report financial information. Accordingly focus on ferreting out SPE
abuse should be primarily placed on the abusers themselves, not the SPEs formed to
perpetrate such abuse. Wide spread legislation and accounting reform merely casts a
broad net with the hopes that the abusers will get snared along with the rest of the fish.
But in the mean time those fish are burdened with the added cost of complex and
complicated compliance when they weren’t doing anything wrong under the old regime
nor had problems complying under the old regime.
So what is the alternative? The forefront of the approach should be a narrow and
isolated focus on SPE abusers. Although the matter has not been completely resolved,
the evidence suggests that actual SPE abusers represent a small pool of companies
relative to the total population of public companies. This could be achieved by the SEC
and or other related gate-keepers taking a “risk-based” approach toward the problem.
First, the gatekeepers should narrow its scope by first focusing on those companies or
industries that lend themselves or could potentially lend themselves toward SPE abuse.
Those industries that tend to deal heavily in derivatives, intangible assets such as the
buying and selling of futures contracts, etc. would be good places to start. Additionally,
those industries or companies that stand to come under earnings pressure, i.e. having
trouble reaching financial forecasts or earnings targets, or seem to be engaging in creative
ways at maintaining earnings and revenue growth.
The overarching idea is that since we have seen it before (ala Enron), that
accumulated knowledge is taken and applied going forward. It could very well be
possible that in terms of SPE abuse, the proprietary abuse that Enron perpetrated was a
local and isolated event. The SEC Report, though useful in the information it contained,
did little to address the question of whether or not there is widespread SPE and offbalance sheet abuse. The Report merely focused on SPE and off-balance sheet use,
which is helpful but doesn’t tell the whole story nor tell the most important part of the
story.
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With all of this collective knowledge and insight as to the accounting fraud that
Enron perpetrated, it is reasonable to conclude that the SEC could derive some sort of
search criteria or “corporate profiling” of either industries or particular companies that
show indicia for potential SPE abuse. Those companies could then be targeted and
special attention and focus could be placed on those companies. Understand that the
initial stages of such action would be non intrusive. The initial stages of the focus would
merely involve a close and scrutinizing look at those companies’ annual and periodic
reports for evidence of SPE abuse or any other type of financial reporting irregularities.
If such scrutiny raises red flags then the SEC could then perform an escalated inquiry into
the matter.
If the escalated inquiry yields problematic accounting, then the next step would be
for the SEC to initiate a more aggressive fact finding inquiry. If accounting irregularities
are found, the indictment, prosecution and ultimate conviction should be a high profile
event. Such would then send a clear and unequivocal message to other similarly situated
offenders to make the proper adjustments in their financial reporting or face the same
fate.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The issues dealt with in this paper are complex and trying to resolve these issues
pose an even greater challenge. But before real effective change can be achieved, we
must first be able to target the root of the problem. Complex problems tend to involve
complex solutions. The band-aid of legislation, more guidance, or “clearer” guidance if
you will, will more than likely result in nothing more than the tug and pull between
standard-setters and issuers to continue along this “move”, “countermove” approach that
has gotten us to where we are today. Until we are able to focus more narrowly on the
problem and deal with it from that more directed approach, we’ll probably be seeing
more of the same. Better mousetrap, better mouse.
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